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SURVEY SECTION
Civil Rights. Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.I. 2000).
In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court will determine the
appropriate statute of limitations by looking to the statute of limi-
tations of the forum state's most analogous cause of action. In this
case, where the plaintiffs alleged that a municipality improperly
collected a water service fee, the appropriate statute was the three-
year limit found in Rhode Island's residual statute for personal in-
jury claims, Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-14(b).
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In April 1986, the Woonsocket City Counsel enacted an ordi-
nance that levied a tapping fee on the owners of properties that
requested connections to the city's water system.' The payments
were mandatory and the city required that they be paid before it
would allow a connection or provide water service.2 The city did
not seek the approval of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
before amending the ordinance. 3 Between June 1986 and July
1992 the city collected approximately $177,800 in tapping fees.4
The plaintiffs paid the required fees without any protest or chal-
lenge. 5 Ultimately, the PUC determined that the tapping fee was
not permitted and the city repealed the ordinance.6 Three years
later, the appellants brought a class action against the city under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to recover their fees paid under the im-
properly enacted ordinance. 7 The superior court conditionally cer-
tified a class and the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment.8 The trial justice noted that the appellant's case might
be barred by the statute of limitations.9 However, the justice
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis
that as a matter of law, the voluntary payment doctrine precluded
their recovery of the payments. 10
1. See Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 168, 170 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 169; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
8. See Paul, 745 A.2d at 169; R.I. Super. Ct. R. 23(c)(1).
9. See Paul, 745 A.2d at 170.
10. See id.
2001] 615
616 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:593
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied a de novo standard
of review.1 The court focused its review on the statute of limita-
tions issue that was noted by the court below. The court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that the proper statute of limitations was the
provision applicable to appeals of a tax assessment. 12 The court
instead noted that since § 1983 does not contain a statute of limita-
tions, the courts are "required to apply the state statute of limita-
tions which governs the forum state's most analogous cause of
action."13 In this case, the court applied the guidance given by the
United States Supreme Court in Owens v. Okure,14 and held that
the applicable statute of limitations was Rhode Island's residual
statute for personal injury claims. 1 5 The court applied the three-
year statute of limitations for "injuries to the person" under Rhode
Island General Laws section 9-1-14(b). 16 Applying this statute to
the case, the court noted that the appellants claimed that the adop-
tion, implementation and enforcement of the injury caused them to
suffer personal injury. 17 To determine the moment at which the
statute of limitations began, the court held that the common law
general rule applied and that the time began ticking at the point
the injury occurred.' 8 In this case, it started to accrue when the
appellants began paying the fee. Since the appellants' last pay-
ment was made three years and seven months before the filing of
the action, the court held that the three-year statute of limitations
had expired and was time barred.19 Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the grant of summary judgment.20
11. See id. at 170-71.
12. See id. at 171. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-5-26 (1956) (1999 Reenact-
ment) (imposing a statute of limitations that expires ninety days after the date the
first tax payment is due).
13. Id. (quoting Tang v. State of Rhode Island, Dept. of Elderly Affairs, 904 F.
Supp. 55, 60-61 (D.R.I. 1995)).
14. 488 U.S. 235 (1989).
15. See Paul, 745 A.2d at 172.
16. See id. at 172 n.4; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14 (b) (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
17. See Paul, 745 A.2d at 172.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 173.
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CONCLUSION
In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the court should ap-
ply the statute of limitations most closely analogous to the claims
asserted by the plaintiffs. In the case of a claim alleging improper
assessment of a water service fee, the appropriate statute of limita-
tions was the three-year time limit imposed by Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws section 9-1-14(b).
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